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By equipping police with data, what are we trying to accomplish?  Certain 
answers ring familiar.  For one thing, we are trying to make criminal justice 
decisions, plagued as they often are by inaccuracy and bias, more refined.1  For 
another, we are trying to boost the efficiency of governance institutions—police 
departments, prosecutor’s offices, municipal courts—that operate under the pall of 
scarcity. 
For the moment, I want to put answers like these to one side; not because they 
are wrong, but because they seem like only part of the story.  Another goal of big 
data policing,2 in addition to those just described, is to produce a social order—a 
surveillance society—in which people constantly monitor and curate the data-trails 
they leave behind in everyday life.  The idea of self-monitoring in response to 
surveillance is not new.  Data intensifies and extends this dynamic; it does not 
create the dynamic ex nihilo.  But the fact remains: in both scale and scope, data 
surveillance today lacks meaningful precedent.  We are fast approaching a world in 
which virtually everything one does at t1—every movement one makes in public, 
every bond one forges on social media, every transaction one participates in—will 
be recorded and archived, becoming a potential foundation for adverse treatment at 
t2. 
Yes, there will continue to be limits on the ability of police to collect data, and 
yes, use-restrictions may be imposed, to greater or lesser practical effect, on data 
already in hand.  But the endgame is not hard to see.  Given enough sensors, 
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enough computational power, enough channels of data “insourcing,”3 enough time, 
and traditional safeguards will run dry.  Long term, we cannot hope to curb the 
psychological effects of totalizing data surveillance.4 
Those effects are best conveyed, I think, by a label the Supreme Court itself 
recently adopted to describe information privacy harms: anxiety.5  The organizing 
principle of a surveillance society like the one just described—the one we 
increasingly inhabit—is constant, low-level consternation about the way one’s 
activity may be perceived by those in power.  The paradigm, you could say, is that 
of a routine, not-yet-escalated traffic stop.  As police enjoy access to more and 
more data, individuals will increasingly stand, at all times, in relation to the state 
the way someone who has been pulled over, awaiting a license-and-registration 
check, does: in a slight-but-taxing state of worry, cautiously hoping that everything 
will be fine.  Or maybe the paradigm is slightly less dramatic: seeing a patrol car in 
your rear-view mirror and feeling your pulse quicken; awareness heightened and 
senses alert, as you try not to break any traffic rules.  (Good luck.) 
Cast in this light, the distinctive feature of big data policing—beyond its 
statistical promise—is that it multiplies, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the 
experience of being subject to “police presence.”  Once all of life is documented 
and databased, once officials can make use (in Stephen Henderson’s words) of 
“time machines,”6 officers no longer need to be investigating contemporaneously, 
let alone physically present, to inspire self-monitoring and behavior modification.  
The logic here is essentially panoptic: a technologically-updated version of 
Bentham’s idealized prison.  Even if no guards currently occupy in the central 
tower, even if no guards ever occupy the central tower, so long as each cell is fitted 
with sensors that record all aspects of the daily life and the records are always 
available for review—a rough analogy to totalizing data surveillance—the 
disciplining effects will be the same.  In many ways, this simple insight is the 
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foundation of predictive policing.  By directing officer attention to areas where 
crime has been forecast as likely, the hypothesis is that we can deter wrongdoing 
before it occurs.  And preliminary empirics seem to bear the hypothesis out.7 
To be clear, I am not saying that data surveillance is liable to make every 
person feel, at every moment, exactly as they would when being directly monitored 
by police.  The point is that the two forms of experience—and of self-monitoring 





All this may sound grim, even fatalistic.  But not so fast.  Anxiety has many 
benefits.  It can be a wellspring of virtuous behavior—or short of that, at least 
compliant behavior.  The reality is that we want people to worry about breaking 
the rules; just not so much that it spills over into other domains of life, hobbling 
autonomy—what we say, think, and do—and frustrating democratic participation.8 
How exactly to strike this balance is, of course, a complex and controversial 
question.  For present purposes, the point is simply that low-level anxiety—as a 
result of data-driven law enforcement—may not be such a bad thing, especially if 
it trades off against the not-so-low-level anxiety that accompanies (1) traditional 
policing, as well as (2) the absence of police.9  And the point is not just 
quantitative.  Not only does big data policing stand to rein in certain pathologies of 
law enforcement; it promises—at least in principle—to do so in progressive ways.  
In other words, the anxiety produced by big data policing has the capacity to be 
redistributive: to impose a small burden on a large swath of the population instead 
of imposing an outsized burden on specific communities where law enforcement 
harms have traditionally run rampant. 
Of course, I’m painting a consciously abstract—and idealized—picture.  
Data-driven solutions are not inherently more progressive (in a distributional 
sense) than their traditional counterparts.  If anything, the practical tendency is 
often the opposite.10  The point is simply that data-driven anxiety plausibly could 
be more equally dispersed than the anxiety wrought by traditional policing.  And as 
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scholars, advocates, and judges craft doctrinal responses to big data policing, it 
should be with its redistributive potential in mind. 
Specifically, there are (at least) two forms of “anxiety redistribution” that big 
data policing might accomplish.  The first is to curb false-positives, which could 
occur in numerous ways.  For one thing, data can discourage police from relying 
on bias, conscious or unconscious, to guide their decisions.  To borrow an example 
from Bennett Capers, “the increased use of public surveillance cameras and facial 
recognition technology, coupled with access to Big Data and perhaps terahertz 
scanners capable of distance scanning for firearms, could do much [to] tackl[e] the 
. . . problem [of] racialized policing,”11 and disrupt the “young plus black equals 
probable cause” equation that stands a shameful hallmark of much contemporary 
policing.12  For another thing, data analysis might facilitate changes in the 
allocation of police resources (say, where officers are dispatched for patrol) or the 
adoption of police tactics, based on historical crime patterns and efficacy rates. 
The second form of “anxiety redistribution” is even simpler: big data tactics 
could displace older policing methods and/or preempt more crime.  As police rely 
more on data, they may rely less on intrusive tactics like stop and frisk, or 
relatedly, they may find more efficient ways to deter low-level crime—or both. 
To reiterate: nothing about the logic or practice of data-driven law 
enforcement makes these redistributive impulses necessary.  On the contrary, they 
will be hard fought—and particularly in our current political climate, unlikely.  In 
an ideal world, however, they would be the lodestar of academic and judicial 




Ultimately, then, the question is how best to manage the anxiety that 
accompanies big data policing—how to capitalize on its capacity both to deter 
crime and to displace more intrusive forms of police work, while keeping its darker 
externalities at bay.  This, needless to say, is an enormous question.  For now, I 
wish simply to call attention to one aspect of existing Fourth Amendment law that 
is plainly not up to the task: the idea that suspicion benchmarks will suffice, in the 
future, to limit police discretion. 
Although this danger has not been lost on commentators,13 I fear its gravity 
has been undersold.  The problem is not merely, as scholars like Andrew Ferguson 
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(rightly) note,14 that in a data-rich world reasonable suspicion and probable cause 
will be much easier, perhaps even trivially easy, to satisfy.  The problem is that, 
going forward, even near-perfect knowledge of wrongdoing may not be enough to 
justify intrusion.  If the Fourth Amendment’s purpose is to constrain the functional 
discretion that state officials enjoy when enforcing the law—and there is ample 
evidence to support this proposition15—big data policing may demand full-blown 
overhaul, not just reform. 
Why?  Because historically, Fourth Amendment doctrine has been able to rely 
on a natural synergy between (1) suspicion benchmarks, which require police to be 
able to explain their targeting decisions ex ante, and (2) anti-discretion principles.  
Demanding the former—requiring the police to build a “mini-case” in advance of 
intrusion—effectively vindicated the latter.  Today, however, this synergy is 
poised to unravel.  In a data-rich world, the police will soon find themselves (to 
borrow a phrase from Paul Ohm) “awash in probable cause,”16 and the question 
should be whether they can justify their investigative activity on freestanding 
“reasonableness” grounds.17  Furthermore, the problem cannot be solved by simply 
ratcheting up the amount of suspicion required to establish probable cause (or, 
depending on the setting, reasonable suspicion).  That approach, though laudable, 
and perhaps appealing on incrementalist grounds, would ultimately just delay the 
inevitable.  Eventually, we will have to confront the question of what requirements 
the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” mandate imposes on top of traditional 
suspicion benchmarks. 
At risk of belaboring the point, consider a hypothetical.  Suppose the NYPD 
develops a tool called the Pot Detector, which allows officers to stand outside a 
townhouse or apartment building, point the device toward the specific unit, and 
obtain a hyper-precise prediction (“yes” / “no”) of whether the unit contains at 
least some amount of marijuana.18  In other words, the Pot Detector operates like a 
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109, 138 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[U]nder the Court’s analysis . . . if a device were 
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radar gun; homing in on marijuana, it yields the correct prediction in virtually 
every case.  The question is: should a “yes” output from the Pot Detector suffice to 
warrant a search of the unit?  Traditionally, the answer would clearly be 
affirmative.  The police all but know the unit contains pot.  Surely that is 
sufficient—indeed, beyond sufficient—to establish probable cause.19 
Yet imagine the discretion this would give police!  The NYPD would be 
effectively free to choose among all residences flagged “yes” on the Pot Detector, 
and perform intrusive searches wherever they wanted.  Maybe—hopefully—they 
would wield this power responsibly.  But the whole point of the Fourth 
Amendment is that police are not allowed to wield power unsupervised; courts 
must be involved.  And to the extent that technologies like the Pot Detector (or its 
real-world, algorithmic equivalent) allow police to bypass judicial supervision, 
they should be cause for constitutional concern. 
I realize the Pot Detector is hyperbolic and reductive.  But that’s the point.  As 
a thought-experiment, it underscores a limitation of using suspicion benchmarks 
like “probable cause” as tools for constraining law enforcement power.  The 
premise of this approach is that police operate from a default position of ignorance 
about crime, from which it follows that requiring police to devise ex ante suspicion 




In a brilliant and provocative essay published under this very masthead a few 
years back, Paul Butler argued that stop and frisk programs are best understood by 
                                                                                                                                                      
cocaine, there would be no Fourth Amendment bar, under the Court’s approach, to the police setting 
up such a device on a street corner and scanning all passersby.  In fact, the Court’s analysis is so 
unbounded that if a device were developed that could detect, from the outside of a building, the 
presence of cocaine inside, there would be no constitutional obstacle to the police cruising through a 
residential neighborhood and using the device to identify all homes in which the drug is present.”).  
Note that I am putting to one side the question of whether using the Pot Detector would qualify as a 
search under Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).  I happen to think it does not, when Kyllo is 
synthesized with the so-called “binary search” doctrine—suggesting that detection methods that 
disclose only contraband do not qualify, in the first instance, as searches—on most prominent display 
in the dog sniff cases.  In other words, the Kyllo rule would not apply (or at the very least, apply for 
different reasons than those articulated in Kyllo) if the “technological enhancement” in question were 
precisely-tailored to contraband.  Either way, the point is that we can imagine at least some methods 
of “perfect detection” that (1) don’t trigger Kyllo and (2) raise the concerns about discretion that I’m 
flagging here. 
19  Things get a little more complicated (1) if the output comes in the form of a conditional 
probability rather than a binary determination, and/or (2) if the false-positive rate is high enough that 
an output no longer seems to establish near-knowledge.  Some of these questions are explored in 
Brennan-Marquez, supra note 15, but I put them to one side here. 
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analogy to torture and terror.20  According to Butler, by detaining and harassing 
people in public (more often than not, men of color), police assert a form of 
control—a reminder of “who is in charge, and the violent consequences of 
dissent”21—similar to low-level torture practices, such as sleep deprivation.22  And 
the result, in the aggregate, is a climate of fear and paralysis not unlike that of a 
community perpetually under siege by threats of terrorism. 
Whether or not one agrees with Butler’s claim, the exercise his essay 
instantiates and invites—drawing out the implications of extant law enforcement 
practices by reference to the ghastlier modes of social control they resemble—is 
quite fruitful.  The difference between anxiety, on one hand, and torture and terror, 
on the other, is that anxiety can coexist, in principle, with liberal democracy, 
whereas torture and terror cannot.  Accordingly, where the implication of Butler’s 
analysis is that stop and frisk programs should be abolished, the implication of my 
analysis is not that big data policing must be abandoned.  Rather, it’s that 
regulation of big data policing must vindicate the Fourth Amendment’s core 
promise: that citizens should be allowed to carry on with their lives, free from 
undue anxiety about arbitrary intervention by the state. 
Historically, this promise has often lain fallow.  Fourth Amendment doctrine 
has frequently served to justify police practices that are sloppy at best—and at 
worst, far worse.  Big data holds out the possibility of something better.  But to 
realize that possibility, we need legal rules that cause data to curtail, rather than 
exacerbate, the traditional pathologies of policing.  The fear, of course, is they will 
do just the opposite. 
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